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THREE LIES AND A TRUTH: ADJUDICATING
MATERNITY IN SURROGACY DISPUTES
Browne C. Lewis'
Three Lies:
(1) The legal mother of the child is the woman who supplies the genetic materialfor
the child's conception.
(2) The legal mother of the child is the woman who contracts to have the child
conceived with the intent to act as the parent
(3) The legal mother of the child is the woman who gives birth to the child.
A Tuth-
Maternity should be awarded based upon a determination of which mother-child
relationship will best serve the child's interests.
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, courts were called on to answer the following question:
What makes a man a legal father? Courts applied different presumptions to
arrive at the answer. For example, if the case involved a married couple,
the woman's husband was presumed to be the legal father.' In situations
involving an unmarried woman, the man who helped to conceive the child
was the legal father.2 While paternity was being litigated, maternity was
resolved-the woman who gave birth to the child was the child's legal
mother.3 The phrase "momma's baby, papa's maybe" reflected society's
attitude towards maternity.4 Since the woman who gave birth to the child
* Associate Professor & Director, Center for Health Law & Policy, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law,
Cleveland State University, BA, Grambling State University-, M.PA, Hubert Humphrey Institute of Public
Affairs; J.D., University of Minnesota School of law, LLM., Energy & Envimnmental Law, University of
Houston College of Law. I would like to thank Dean Phyllis Crocker and the Cleveland Marshall fund for
supporting my research. I would also like to thank Professor Robin Wilson and the participants in the William &
Mary Junior Faculty Workshop for their comments on the article. Special thanks to my scholarship support
group: Professors Heidi Robertson, Alan Weinstein and Kristina Niedringhaus.
I Theresa Glennon, Somedy's OM- The Easion of the Marital Ifenahnptmn of Patemiy, 102 W. VA. L REV. 547,
550(2000).
2 See Browne Lewis, Ozil&m of Mm. Balancing tie Inheitace Rghts of Marital md oM-Mmital Orildrm, 39 U.
ToLL REV. 1, 9-11 (2007).
3Janet L DolginJisa GacjucialAarmmrso AboutParadood 40 UCLAL REV. 637,672-73 (1993).
4 David M. Buss, Faluion and lionan Mateg, 18 HARV.J.L & PUB. POL'Y 537,543--44 (1995).
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also supplied the genetic material that created the child, maternity was not
usually challenged.5  Hence, the courts did not have a hard time
adjudicating maternity. Advances in reproductive technology have led to a
change in the legal landscape. Consequently, two different women may
claim to be the legal mother of the same child.6 As usual, the law has been
slow to respond to the advances in medicine.7
Currently, with regard to children conceived using assisted
reproduction, paternity is well-settled and maternity is debatable. In most
jurisdictions, the man who consents to his wife being artificially inseminated
using donor sperm is the legal father of the resulting child.8 Moreover, in
the majority of states, a sperm donor is not recognized as the artificially
conceived child's legal father.9 The use and availability of reproductive
technology has made maternity more complicated. Courts do not have a
bright-line rule to apply in order to determine maternity. The uniformity
that exists among jurisdictions with regard to paternity cases involving
artificially conceived children is lacking in maternity cases involving two
women who want to be declared the legal mother of the child.'0
Consequently, courts are forced to adjudicate the maternity of women
involved in surrogacy arrangements in a piecemeal fashion. In making
maternity determinations, courts have bought into the lie that the crucial
factor is the reproductive rights of the women involved in the process. Based
upon that lie, courts have applied several different standards to determine
legal maternity. Some courts have ignored the one truth that has been
consistent in different areas of family law: the "best interests of the child"
standard is the appropriate one to use when making decisions that impact
children."
This Article is divided into four main Parts. Part II introduces the
problem. Part III contains a discussion of the limited role legislatures have
played in clarifying the legal status of the women involved in the surrogacy
5 Se id
6 Sw Alice Hofheimer, Note, Gataonal S uy Unsetthng State Partage Law and Sumngac Poly, 19 N.Y.U.
REV. L & Soc. CHANGE 571, 571 (1992).
1 SeeJanet L Dolgin, An Fnaging COummr Rqproduchse Tino&q and the Law, 23 VT. L REV. 225, 234
(1998).
, Browne Lewis Twm Fars, One Dad Allcating Patonal Oblgaions Betuan e Mn Invoked in de Artocial
Insonm Ieers, 13 LEwIS & CIARK L REV. 949,959 (2009).
9 Id at 973.
o S eg., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. CL App. 1998); In re Marriage of
Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); se alsojonathan B. Pitt, Case Note, Frgnatng Pmocreaton,
108 YALE LJ. 1893, 1893 (1999).
1 Bridgette A Car, Inworpoaing a '"Best Inamestr of de C" Apprach into hrnmgration Law and Tocesae, 12
YAl HUM. RTS. & DEV. LJ. 120,124 (2009).
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process. Part IV analyzes the tests or standards courts have employed to
determine maternity in surrogacy cases. Part V explains the reasons why
the best interests of the child standard is the one that courts should apply to
determine the legal mother of the child conceived as the result of a
surrogacy agreement.12
II. THE PROBLEM
A. The Gestator (Gestational Surrogate)'3
While studying drama at Yale, actors Angela Bassett and Courtney
Vance met and fell in love with each other.'4 More than a decade later, the
couple got married. The couple enjoyed a successful marriage and acting
careers.' 5 Nonetheless, there was something missing in their lives. After
years of infertility, Ms. Bassett and Mr. Vance had an embryo created using
her eggs and his sperm implanted into a surrogate. The surrogate gave
birth to the couple's twins.' 6 Although the surrogate gestated the twins, she
did not have a biological connection to them. As in most surrogate
arrangements, the surrogate relinquished her parental rights and
surrendered the child to the couple. If the surrogate decided not to
relinquish her rights to the children, should she have standing to fight for
custody of the children?
Married couple Ikufumi and Yuki Yamada desperately wanted a child.
Since the couple could not conceive naturally, they signed a surrogacy
agreement with Dr. Nanya Patel.17 Presumably under the terms of the
agreement, after the child was born, the surrogate promised to give up her
parental rights so that the Yamadas could adopt the baby.'8 Prior to the
12 Scholars like Ilana Huritz have advocated for adopting the best interests of the child standard to make
parnthood determination in surogacy cases. S* eg., Ilana Hurvitz, ColaboradveReprhcho: Fzding the Ouildin the
Maze ofl alModwhood, 33 CoNN. L REV. 127, 169-74 (2000). Others have criticized the use of the standard to
adjudicate maternity. S eg., Rene R. Gilliam, Note, When A Surngate Modur Braks a Annis The Inappropiatess of
the Traonal "Best Interests ofthe OWdd" Stadard, 18 MEMPHIS ST. U. L REV. 514, 527-32 (1988). I differ from
those persons in the manner in which I think the court should apply the standant.
13 A gestational surrogate has been defined as "the woman who gives birth to a child regardless of her
genetic relationship to the child." VA. CODE ANN. § 20-156 (West, Westiaw through 2010 Reg. Sess.).
4 Angela Basset and Cowrery B. Vwe, OPAuH.COM (Mar. 5, 2007), www.oprah.com/oprahradio/Angela-
Bassett-and-Courtney-B-Vance.
15 Sw id; Stephen M. Silverman, Twic forAngela Basrett & Courrtey Vace, PEOPLE.COM (Jan. 30,2006, 10:00
PM), http://www.people.com/people/artide/0,,1 154648,00.htrml.16 Se Silverman, supra note 15.
1 Usha R. Smerdon, Crassig Bodi Crossig Bordehs Itonational Swngacy Betawn the Unitd State and India, 39
CUMB. L REV. 15, 69 (2008).
18 For a discussion of the operation of Dr. Patel's surrogacy clinic, see id at 48-50.
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birth of the child, the Yamadas divorced.' 9 Consequently, Ms. Yamada
decided that she did not want to adopt the child.20 Despite Ms. Yamada's
decision, the surrogate relinquished her parental rights. 21 Therefore the
child was legally motherless. Mr. Yamada still wanted to adopt the child,
but Indian law prohibited a single man from adopting.22 As a result, the
child was left in a legal limbo.23 Should the contracting woman be
adjudicated the legal mother and forced to adopt the child? Should the
surrogate who gave birth to the child be prevented from abandoning the
child?
As the above examples illustrate, the surrogacy process enables a
woman who is unable to carry a child to become a mother. Under the
surrogacy arrangement, one woman agrees to assist another woman in
having a child. The type of assistance the surrogate provides varies. For
example, the surrogate's role may be limited to that of a gestator or carrier.
Gestational surrogacy involves the implantation of an embryo into the
uterus of the woman acting as the surrogate.24 If the contracting woman is
capable of producing eggs but is unable to carry a child, her eggs are
fertilized with her husband's sperm to create the embryo that is implanted
in the woman serving as a surrogate.25 On the other hand, if the woman is
incapable of producing eggs and cannot carry a child, a donor's eggs are
united with the sperm of the woman's husband in order to create the
embryo gestated by the surrogate. 26  In either case, the gestational
surrogate27 is not biologically related to the child.28 However, that fact has
not prevented litigation over whether or not the gestational surrogate has
parental rights.
'9 Id at 70.
21 SeeJapanme Girl Born to Indian Surogte Arm Home, CNN.com (Nov. 2, 2008), http://www.cnn.com/
2008/WORLD/asiapc/1/02/india.baby/index.html?iref=allsearch ("[N]either the birth mother nor the
mother who had originally sought the child wanted to be involved.").
22 Id
23 Se id
24 Jamie L Zuckennan, Comment, Frone Makeover--&qumy Ediio.- Rtsessinsg de Manaige Requrosnmt in
Gestationa Sunogay Coiracts and the Rht To Rade Cosent in Traional Sngacy Agrenmts, 32 NOVA L REV. 661,
663-64 (2008) (discussing the different types ofgestational sunogacy arrangements).
25 Ronald Chester, To Be B; Be. . .Not Just To &- Legal and Soia Imp&aions ofCoigfor Hwman Reproducain,
49 FIA. L REV. 303,331 (1997).
26 Iori B. Andrews & Usa Douglass, Aftanaive Reprodiction, 65 S. CALL REV. 623, 631 (1991).
27 
"Gestational surogate" is often defined as a woman who agrees to conceive a child using reproductive
technology without utilizing her own eggs. Ses ag., FA. STAT. ANN. § 742.13(5) (West, Westlaw through Chap.
274 (End) ofthe 2010 2d Reg. Sess. ofthe 21st Leg.).
2 Bernard Friedland & Valerie Epps, The Okargin Fmiy and the US Imagraon Lam The Jnoact ofMeacal
Repixctce Tknvolng as de ImrmWahon and Natonaly Act's Dofmiion ofthe Fasil, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. LJ. 429, 454
(1997).
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B. The Procreator (Traditional Surrogate)29
After Michael Jackson died, his mother, Katherine Jackson, filed a
petition seeking custody of Michael Jackson's three young children.30 Ms.
Jackson's petition stated that the children had no relationship with their
biological mothers.3' Debbie Rowe was listed as the mother of Jackson's
two older children.32 With regard to "Blanket," Jackson's youngest child,
the petition presumably listed the mother as "None."33 According to
Jackson's will, in the event that his mother is unable to care for the children,
Diana Ross should be permitted to raise the three children.34 The probate
court complied with Mr. Jackson's wishes and appointed Ms. Jackson as the
children's permanent legal guardian.35 The court also gave Ms. Rowe
liberal visitation with the two older children.36 When MichaelJackson died
onJune 24, 2009, Blanket and his two siblings became fatherless. However,
unlike his siblings, Blanket was born legally motherless. 37 Thus, Blanket is a
legal orphan. Blanket's legal status makes him more vulnerable than his
siblings. If both Ms. Jackson and Ms. Ross predeceased Mr. Jackson, since
Ms. Rowe's parental rights were not terminated, she is the legal mother of
the two older children.38 That status gives Ms. Rowe the opportunity to
parent those children. If she could be identified, should Blanket's biological
mother be given the same opportunity?
An Israeli couple was devastated when a Palestinian sniper killed their
son, Keivan, in August 2002.39 Instead of grieving, the couple was
2 A traditional surogate is a woman who both contributes a gamete to create the child and gives birth to
the child See Jennifer L Watson, Grouing a Baby for Sale or Merely Rm*ing a Womb S&ould SV=Uogate Mothers &
Compassaidfor Their Serices?, 6 WHnTHERJ. CHILD &FAM. ADVOC. 529,529(2007).
3o Steve Helling & Champ Clark, Joe and KaherineJackmor Want 77ose Odram, PEOPLE.COM (June 29, 2009,
12:50 PM), http://www.people.com/people/package/aride/,,20287787_20288314,00.html
31Id
32 Id
" See Kaoe Jackson Manled Childm's Guardra, MSNBC.COM, http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/
32270692/ns/today-entertainment/ (last updated Aug. 3, 2009) (noting that "Blanket" was born through a
surmgate with no parental rights).
31See Luchina Fisher et al., Mchad Jackson's Love for Diana Ross Contes Fn in Ikath, ABC NEws (July 2,
2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Entenainment/MichaelJackson/story?id=7984854&page= 1.
35 Alan Duke, Deal Reached For Qsay of Madad Jakson's Gaildrm, CNN.com (July 30, 2009),
http://artides.cnn.com/2009-07-30/entenainment/jackson.children.custody_j.katheine-jackson-debbie-mwe-
ms-jacksons=PM:SHOWBlZ.
36 Se id
7 See Kahne Jackson Aanled ddrm's Guardan, supra note 33 (noting that the surrogate that carried
"Blanket' had no parental rights).
- Se gneraly Cowt Voids Debbie Roras Loss of Rights to Jacv's Kds, FOXNEws.COM (Feb. 16, 2006),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,185083,00.html.
3 Frndy of Dead Lraek Solie Can Use Hfis San, MSNBC.coM (Jan. 29, 2007),
http://www.msnbc.msncom/id/16871062/; se also Ruth Zafran, Dyg To Be A Fathe Legal Paternip in Case of
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proactive. They decided to create a grandchild to rear. A doctor extracted
sperm from Keivan's body.40 Then, the couple hired a surrogate to
contribute genetic material and give birth to their grandchild.41 Baby Doe
was born legally motherless to a woman who never knew his father.42 If the
surrogate decided that she wanted to keep the child instead of giving it to
the grandparents, should she be permitted to do so? In the event something
happens to the elderly couple, should the surrogate be permitted to take
custody of the child?
The second type of surrogacy arrangement involves a traditional
surrogate. A traditional surrogate is a woman who is artificially inseminated
with the sperm of the contracting woman's husband or significant other.43
Since her eggs are used to create the child, the traditional surrogate is
biologically related to the child.44 As a consequence, traditional surrogacy
agreements usually contain provisions requiring the surrogate to terminate
her parental rights and allowing the contracting woman to adopt the child.45
As in any contract dispute, courts do not become involved until one or more
of the parties to the contract decide not to abide by the terms of the
contract. In a surrogacy situation, the legal dispute usually arises when the
surrogate refuses to surrender the child to the intended parent or parents.
The courts are called upon to identify the legal parents of the child.46
III. LEGISLATING MATERNITY
It is important that the parent-child relationship47 be legally recognized
because the existence of that relationship impacts so many aspects of the
child's life. For example, in order for the child to have the right to receive
financial support from an adult, the person seeking the support must show
that a legal parent-child relationship exists. The recognition of that
Postannous Concephm, 8 Hous.J. HEALTH L &POL'Y 47,54 n.22 (2007).
4o Farndy oflDed Israeli Soldier Can Use His Spen, supra note 39.41 Seid
42 See Zafran, supra note 39, at 54.
43 Steven H. Snyder & Mary P. Bym, The Use of(Pehirth Parmtage Orders in Smsgay Procadings, 39 FAM. LQ
633,639(2005).
4* Emily Stark Comment, Born to No Modzer In re Roberto D.B. and Equal Proteckon for Gestaonal Sunogate
RbuttingManiy, 16 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L 283,287 (2007).
45 Ser Sherrie L Russell-Bmowne, Parental Rights mid Geataional Sogacy: An ArganatAgat the Gmnetic Stadmd,
23 COUJM. HUM. RTs. L REv. 525, 527 (1992); see also Kermit Roosevelt III, The Nwest bperty: Rpluctive
TelZ*ologie and die Con4t ofPrathOod 39 SANTA CLARA L REv. 79, 125 (1998).
6 See, eg.,J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).47 CAL FAM. CODE § 7601 (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.; all 2009-2010 1st thmough 5th, 7th,
and 8th Exec. Sess.; urgency legis. through Ch. 301 of the 2010 Reg. Sess.; and all Props. on 2010 ballots)
("Parent and child relationship'. . . means the legal relationship existing between a child and the child's natural
or adoptive parents incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations. The
term includes the mother and child relationship and the father and child relationship.").
[Vol. 49:371378
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relationship also affects the child's ability to inherit from his or her parents
and to receive certain government benefits.48 Parents benefit from the
establishment of the relationship because it gives them the legal right to
make important decisions with regard to the child.49 In addition, the
existence of a legal parent-child relationship prevents the government and
others from terminating the person's parental rights and removing the child
from his or her care without cause.50
Most state statutes do not establish a mechanism for creating the
mother-child relationship in the context of a surrogacy arrangement. The
state statutes that do address the maternity issue do so in several ways.
Some state statutes indicate that birth is the key indicator of motherhood.5'
However, legal maternity may be reallocated by a valid surrogacy
contract.52  Other statutes emphasize intent,53  still others emphasize
gestation, 54 as the factor that should be used to determine which woman
should be recognized as the child's legal mother. In states that permit
surrogacy contracts to be enforced, the terms of the contract may control
the allocation of maternity.55 Thus, the intended mother is usually found to
be the legal mother if the contract complies with the mandates of the statute
and is approved by the court.56 If the contract is invalid,57 or unenforceable
8 Richard L Brown, Dsaeri ng the 'Lgal Orfph'an Inhuimtace Rwhts of Ckibm Alr Terminaton of Parntal
Rhts, 70 MO. L REV. 125, 144-45 (2005).
4 Se Erin K Bybee, Case Note, FUily ImV-Parmtal R -otaton of Parmtal Rghts in Cusody and
Teminabon ofParmtal Rghts Cases in Tmness, 75 TENN. L REV. 151, 155-56 (2007).
5o Richard L Brown, Undeving Heirs?-The Case ofthe 'Teninatel" Parn, 40 U. RICH. L REV. 547, 549
(2006).
-' S, eg., ARK. CODEANN. § 9-10-201(b), (c)(1) (West, Westlaw through end of 2010 Fiscal Sess., including
changes made by Ark. Code Rev. Comm. received through July 1, 2010); sm also N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§ 30.1-04-19(6) (West, Wesdaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.) (providing that the woman who gives birth, unless she is
a gestational surrogate, is the child's legal mother).
52 See g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.101(1)(d) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Legis. effective through
Jan. 1, 2011).
53 S &g., TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.760 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2009 Reg. and 1st Called
Sess. of the 81st Leg.).
5 Se* ag., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158(A)(1) (West, Westlaw through end of 2010 Reg. Sess.) ("The
gestational mother of a child is the child's mother."). But s Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356, 1361 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that statute naming gestational surgate the legal mother without giving the biological
mother who donated the eggs the opportunity to prove maturity violates the equal protection clause).
-5 SA; eg., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-159(B).
- Se id § 20-159(A) ("A surrogate, her husband, if any, and prospective intended parents may enter into a
written agreement whereby the surrogate may relinquish all her rights and duties as parent of a child conceived
through assisted conception, and the intended parents may become the parents of the child. . . .").
51 Several states have statutes setting forth the process for having a surrogacy arrangement validated. Se;
eg., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:23 (Westlaw through laws cunently effective Sept. 10, 2010 through Ch. 381
of the 2010 Reg. Sess. and Ch. I of the Special Sess.); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.755 (West, Westlaw through
end of the 2009 Reg. and Ist Called Sess. of the 81st Leg.).
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for some reason, the surrogate is typically recognized as the child's legal
mother.58
Some jurisdictions treat surrogacy arrangements similar to adoptions.59
As a result, the surrogate is given a specific period of time after the birth of
the child to give notice of her intent to keep the child.60 Once that notice is
given, the court designates the surrogate as the legal mother of the child.
6
'
Some states only permit pure gestational surrogate arrangements where the
surrogate is not allowed to use her own eggs. In those jurisdictions, the
gestational surrogate is not recognized as the child's legal mother.62 Thus,
gestation is not the standard used to determine maternity.63 Finally, if there
is a dispute between the intended mother and the surrogate over custody of
the child, in some jurisdictions, the court will assign maternity based upon
what it considers to be the best interests of the child.64 The lack of
legislation in this area has led to custody disputes between the surrogate and
the contracting couple.
IV. IDENTIFYING THE IES
In states where the statutes do not enumerate the factors to be used to
identify the legal mother of a child born as the result of a surrogacy
arrangement, courts have to determine which woman is the child's legal
mother. There is no uniform test for allocating maternity in those cases.
Thus, courts have adopted several different tests to determine the identity of
the legal mother of the child. The cases in this Part illustrate the application
of those tests. Prior to analyzing those cases, it is helpful to discuss the first
case in which a court seemed to slowly embrace the lie that maternity
should be determined based upon the actions or status of the women
involved in the process.
5 S eg., N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-18-05 (West, Wesdaw thmugh 2009 Reg. Sess.); se a&o VA. CODE
ANN. § 20-158(D).
5 S eg., AH.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A2d 948 (NJ. Super. CL Ch. Div. 2000).
6o N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:25(IV).
61 Id
set 750 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/6(aXIXA) (West, Westlaw thmugh PA 96-1382 of the 2010 Reg.
Sess. 2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.754(aX2); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801(1) (West, Westiaw thmugh
2010 Gen. Sess.).
63 Se 750 lu. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/6(a)(1)(A); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160. 7 54{a)2); UTAH CODE
ANN. §78B-15-801(I).
64 S eg., MIcH. COM]P. lAWS ANN. § 722.861 (West, Westlaw thmugh PA 2010, No. 217, of the 2010
Reg. Sess., 95th Leg.).
[Vol. 49:371380
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A. First There Was the Fallacy
In the Matter of Baby 465
The first major case involving a surrogacy custody dispute was Baby
M.66 The case brought the maternity issue to the attention of the general
public. The court had the difficult task of determining which woman
involved in the process should be designated as the child's legal mother.
The case involved a surrogacy contract signed by William Stern and Mary
Beth Whitehead.67 Under the terms of the contract, Ms. Whitehead agreed
to be artificially inseminated with Mr. Stem's sperm. 68 Based on the
contract, after the child's birth, Ms. Whitehead was required to take steps to
terminate her parental rights.69 Ms. Stem planned to adopt the child.70
Ms. Stern was not a party to the surrogacy agreement, but the contract gave
her sole custody of the child if Mr. Stern died.7' Mr. Stern agreed to pay
Ms. Whitehead $10,000 after she turned the child over to him. 2 "In a
separate contract, Mr. Stern agreed to pay $7,500 to the Infertility Center
of New York" to compensate the Center for its part in the procedure.73
When the baby was born, Ms. Whitehead did not want to give the baby
to the Sterns.74 During her pregnancy, Ms. Whitehead developed a bond
with the child.75 However, Ms. Whitehead eventually turned the child over
to the Sterns.76 Later, Ms. Whitehead fell into a deep depression.77 Ms.
Whitehead went to the Sterns' home and told them that she could not live
without her baby.78 The Sterns felt sorry for Ms. Whitehead because they
were afraid she planned to hurt herself.79 Hence, they agreed to let her
keep the baby for a week.80 Ms. Whitehead promised to return the child to
65 In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (NJ. 1988).
66 For a general discussion of Baby M, see Vicki C. Jackson, Baby M and the Quesn OfPareniod, 76 GEO.
LJ. 1811 (1988).
67 In reBaly M, 537 A.2d at 1235.
68 Id
69 S, i
71Id
72 I
73,I
74 Said at 1236.
o Id
76 I
77Id
18 1Id at 1236-37.
79Setid at 1237.
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the Stems at the end of the specified period.8' Ms. Whitehead did not keep
her promise, so the authorities had to forcibly remove the baby from her.82
The Stems sued to enforce the surrogacy contract.83 They asked the
court to order Ms. Whitehead to comply with the terms of the contract.8 4
Specifically, the Stems wanted the court to terminate Ms. Whitehead's
parental rights and to place the child in their custody permanently.85 In
addition, they asked the court to give Ms. Stem permission to adopt the
child.86
The court had to decide whether the surrogacy contract was valid.87 In
response, the court voided the agreement because it was against the public
policy of the state.88 According to the court, it was illegal to compensate a
woman for acting as a surrogate.89 The court opined that the practice had
the potential to be degrading to women.90 Once it invalidated the contract,
the court awarded custody based upon genetics and the best interests of the
child.9' As the biological father, Mr. Stem received custody of the child
because the court found that arrangement to be in the child's best
interests.92 However, based on her biological connection to the child, the
court adjudicated Ms. Whitehead to be the child's legal mother.93 That
status entitled Ms. Whitehead to visitation rights.94 Thus, the case was
remanded, so the lower court could address that issue.95 Ms. Whitehead did
not have to terminate her parental rights, and Ms. Stern did not get the
right to adopt the child. In its opinion, the court indicated that a surrogacy
agreement might be enforceable if an uncompensated woman voluntarily
agreed to act as a surrogate.96 However, the court noted that, in order to be
enforceable, the contract could not contain a provision requiring the
woman to give up custody of her child.97
8 S, id
82 Se id
84 Id
85 Id
8S id at 1237-38.
88d at 1240.
8 See id at 1240, 1246-50.
90d at 1250.
91 Seid at 1256.
92Id at 1258-59.
3Se id at 1253.
4See id at 1263.
95Id at 1261.
96Sm id at 1264.
97 S, id
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In the Baby M case, it is clear that the court meant for biology to be the
sole indicator of maternity. The court determined maternity by comparing
the actions of the women involved in the process. Ms. Whitehead was
actively involved in the process because she contributed the genetic material
used to conceive the child and she gestated the child. For practical
purposes, there was no difference between Ms. Whitehead and a woman
who conceived a child through sexual intercourse. Thus, the court's
decision to adjudicate Ms. Whitehead as the legal mother did not cause
much public outrage. The court viewed Ms. Stern as a passive participant
who did not make any contributions to the child's conception. Ms. Stern
was treated like a potential adoptive mother. As a stranger to the child, she
did not have any maternal rights. In reaching its decision, the court
weighed the reproductive rights of each woman.
The best interests of the child standard was used to determine which of
the legal parents should receive physical custody of the child. In keeping
with past precedents, the court did not use the best interests of the child
standard to make the initial parentage decision.98 By ignoring the interests
of the child, the court perpetuated the lie that the fitness of the adults to
raise the child is not relevant when it comes to adjudicating parentage.
Throughout the opinion, the court treated the traditional surrogate as the
legal mother of the child.99 Consequently, the court never raised the issue
of Ms. Stern's maternal right. The court seemed to assume that, since she
did not supply the genetic material to create the child, Ms. Stern should not
be recognized as the child's legal mother even if it would be in the child's
best interests to do so. As the cases in the next section illustrate, several
courts have challenged that assumption by relying on other lies.
B. Then Courts Embraced the Lies
1. The Legal Mother Is the Woman Who Supplies the Genetic Material
Used To Conceive the Child.
In most contexts, courts have relied upon genetics to designate
parentage. For example, paternity tests are utilized to ensure that the man
recognized as the child's legal father is biologically related to the child.100
Furthermore, in order to lose custody or be denied visitation, the biological
9 Sw id at 1243.
99S eg., id at 1240.
0 See Niccol D. Kording, liule White hi dida Dsry Chid&'s i-Rereatig Ptmny Fraud Laur To Ivtot
Oildrrm's Inests, 6.J.L & FAM. STUD. 237, 252 (2004).
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parent must be found unfit.' 0 Society places a high value on blood
relations. The law reflects that respect for blood connections by granting
preference to blood relatives in several contexts. For instance, a biological
parent must give consent before his or her child can be legally adopted.
This is true even in cases where the biological parent has no relationship
with the child. 0 2 In addition, as a consequence of the fascination with
blood ties, in most jurisdictions, stepchildren are not permitted to inherit
from stepparents under the intestacy system (unless the children have been
adopted).103 The reasoning behind that exclusion is that a person would
want preference given to his or her biological children.'" It is not
surprising that some courts think that biology should be the main indicator
of parentage. In particular, those courts have indicated that the test for
maternity is genetics. The following case demonstrates that prevarication.
Belsito v. Clark'05
A diagnosis of cervical cancer caused Shelly Belsito to lose her uterus. 06
However, the doctor left Shelly's ovaries intact, and she was able to produce
eggs. 07 When Shelly and Anthony Belsito got married, they agreed that
they wanted to have children. 08 Carol S. Clark, Shelly's sister, agreed to
act as a surrogate for the couple.109 Two of the embryos that were created
by fertilizing Shelly's eggs with Anthony's sperm were implanted in Carol's
uterus. 0 A couple of weeks later, a test confirmed Carol was pregnant with
a child conceived from one of Shelly and Anthony's embryos."'
When she was getting ready for the impending birth of the child, Shelly
spoke with the hospital personnel about the child's birth certificate." 2  At
that time, they told her that, since Carol was giving birth to the child, Carol,
101 Sm Suzette M. Haynie, Biologica Parats v. Third Parties Whose Rgzt to Oid Custdy is COnstdionaly
liot&tP, 20 GA. L REV. 705, 708 (1986).
' S eg., Gary Debele, Cust4 adParmligBy Prans Oter tda Bioleal Pfats WhmNon-TraditioFani y
Law Colhdi with dwCoisttuton, 83 N.D. L REV. 1227, 1236 (2007).
10 See Margaret M. Mahoney, Steppurts as 77hd Pmtier in Rela/ion t Their S&tphdrm, 40 FAM. LQ 81, 98
(2006); Andrew L Noble, Intestate Surcssion for Sa&kcibrm in Panyloania A Proposal for Rfoun, 64 U. PIr. L REV.
835,840(2003).
104 S&e Mahoney, upra note 103, at 99.
05 Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E2d 760 (Ohio Ct. Corn. Pl. 1994). For an analysis of Belsito, see Dawn Wenk,
Note, Belsito v Clak Ohio's Battk wt 'Mod"hood"28 U. TOLL REv. 247 (1996).
106 Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 761.
0 8Sr id at 760-61.
10 Id at 761.
"I Id
"12Id at 762.
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not Shelly, would be listed on the birth certificate as the child's legal
mother. 13  Shelly also learned that the child would be considered
illegitimate because the legal parents, Carol and Anthony, were not married
to each other.114 In response, Shelly and Anthony went to court seeking a
declaration that, since they were the child's legal parents, they did not need
to adopt the child.1 5 They also asked for a court order mandating that the
child be listed as legitimate on the birth certificate and that they be listed as
the legal parents on the birth certificate." 6
The court had to decide whom to designate as the child's legal and
natural parents. In order to make that determination, the court had to
decide what makes a person a natural parent." 7 After reviewing the case
law, the court concluded that, in order for a person to be deemed a natural
parent, the person had to be connected to the child by blood.1 8 That blood
connection was established by proof that the person and the child were
genetically connected by DNA.119 The court opined that "the test to
identify the natural parents should be, 'Who are the genetic parents?"'"
20
The court put forth several reasons why it adopted the genetic test.
First, the court contended that a genetic test was more consistent with the
public policy of not permitting a woman to sell her parental rights.121 The
court reasoned that, since she did not provide the genetic material used to
create the child, the surrogate was not the child's natural mother.122 Thus,
whenever the surrogate surrendered the child, she would not be exchanging
her parental rights for a monetary payment. In that case, the surrogate
would simply be fulfilling the terms of the contract. Second, the court
concluded that the genetic test would be easy to apply. Any dispute with
regard to the identity of the natural mother could be easily resolved through
DNA testing.'23
According to the court, the identification of the natural parent might
not be the end of the inquiry.124 A surrogate who did not contribute genetic
"
9 1dMat 763.
"
0
o1M at 766.
113 Id t76r 7
115 Id
119Id at 763.6
124Id at 767.
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material to create the child is not the child's natural mother. Nonetheless,
that woman might be classified as the child's legal mother. 125 In order to
become the child's legal mother, the surrogate had to follow the dictates of
the state's adoption laws.' 26 In this case, the court did not fully address the
steps necessary for a gestational surrogate to be recognized as the child's
legal mother because Carol did not assert her maternal rights.'27
The court held that Anthony and Shelly were the child's natural parents
because they contributed the genetic materials used to conceive the child.'28
Moreover, the court ruled that, since Anthony and Shelly did not relinquish
or waive their parental rights, they were the child's legal parents.129 In sum,
the court decided that the genetic mother is always the natural mother of
the child. The natural mother is also the child's legal mother unless she
takes steps to terminate her maternal rights so that another woman can be
designated the legal mother. 30 The court made it clear that the woman
who contributed the genetic material to create the child had superior rights
over the woman who gave birth to the child.' 3 ' The court adopted the
genetics test to determine matermity in a surrogacy arrangement.
The court attempted to treat a child conceived as the result of a
surrogacy arrangement similar to a child conceived by sexual intercourse.
If a man uses his penis to fertilize a woman's eggs with his sperm, she is
clearly the child's natural mother. Under the standard set out in Belhito, the
outcome would not be different just because the child was conceived using
scientific means. Thus, if a doctor fertilizes a woman's eggs with a man's
sperm and inserts the embryo into another woman's body, the woman who
supplied the eggs does not lose her biological connection to the child. A
woman who conceives a child naturally can sever her connection to the
child and put the child up for adoption, so that another woman can become
the child's legal mother. The reasoning of the Belsito case indicates that the
same option is available to a woman who contributes the genetic material in
a surrogacy arrangement. That woman can voluntarily relinquish her right
to the child, so that the surrogate or another woman can become the child's
legal mother. In either case, the law cannot force the woman to turn her
125 S, id
127 Id
28 Id
129Id
131Id ('The birth test becomes subordinate and secondary to genetics.").
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biological child over to another woman. However, some courts assert that
intentions should outweigh genetics.
2. The Legal Mother Is the Woman Who Signs the Contract with the Intent
of Parenting the Child.
According to Professor Shultz, courts should adjudicate legal
parenthood by considering the parties' intentions.132  In particular,
Professor Shultz contends, "intentions that are voluntarily chosen,
deliberate, express and bargained-for ought presumptively to determine
legal parenthood."133 Some courts have applied this logic to conclude that
evaluating the parties' intent should be the method used to resolve custody
disputes between surrogates and contracting couples. The next case
demonstrates reliance on that falsehood.
Johnson v. Calvertl34 (Majorily Opinion)
Mark and Crispina Calvert's plans to become parents were thwarted
when Crispina had to have a hystercctomy. 3 Nonetheless, since Crispina
was still capable of producing eggs, the couple decided to arrange for a
surrogate to carry their child. 36 Anna Johnson agreed to act as a surrogate
for the couple.'37 The parties signed a surrogacy agreement.13 8 Under the
terms of the agreement, Anna would carry a child conceived using an
embryo created from Mark's sperm and Crispina's eggs.139 After the birth
of the child, Anna promised to relinquish her parental rights to the child
and to surrender the child to the Calverts.140 In exchange, Mark and
Crispina agreed to pay Anna $10,000 and to insure Anna's life for
$200,000.141 The $10,000 was scheduled to be paid in installments.142
After Anna became pregnant with the couple's child, relations between the
parties soured.'43 Eventually, Anna demanded that the Calverts pay the
I Majoie M. Shultz, Roroductiwe TaknologV and Intat-Based Parathood An Opporam iyfor Gmdr Neulral,
1990 WIs. L REV. 297, 302.
' Id at 323.
1"Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
135 id at 778.
137,1d
13Id
139 Id
140 Id
141 I42 Id
143 Said
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remainder of the payments she was owed.144 Anna threatened to keep the
child if she did not receive all of the money. 145 In response, the Calverts
filed a lawsuit to be legally recognized as the parents of the unborn child.146
Then, Anna brought an action requesting to be declared the child's legal
mother.147 The court consolidated the cases.'48
Blood tests showed that the Calverts were the child's genetic parents.149
The court had to decide the identity of the child's natural mother under
California law. The trial court held that the Calverts were the child's
"genetic, biological and natural" parents and Anna had no parental rights
with regard to the child. 50 After the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision, Anna filed an appeal with the California Supreme
Court.'5 '
The supreme court relied on the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) to
resolve the dispute.'52 Anna based her claim to the child on the fact that she
gestated and gave birth to the child. 53 The Calverts countered by arguing
that since the child was conceived using her genetic material, Crispina was
the child's legal mother. 54 When allocating maternity, the court had to
decide whether to give preference to the woman having the blood
connection to the child or the woman giving birth to the child. The court
decided that both women were able to produce evidence of a mother-child
relationship under the provisions of the statute.' 55 According to one section
of the UPA, maternity could be proven by the use of genetic evidence
gathered through blood testing.'56 Since the blood tests indicated that
Crispina was the child's genetic mother, she could satisfy the evidentiary
requirements of the statute.157 Another portion of the statute stated that a
woman could establish the mother-child relationship by showing she gave
birth to the child.' 58 In the case at bar, Anna was able to prove that fact.'59
14-4Id.
145Id
146Id
147Id
1s2 S, id
Is' Id
152 Sai at 779.
153 Id
154 Id
"15Id at 78 1.
156 Id
158 Id
1595j Smi t70
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Both women satisfied the statutory mandates to prove maternity, so the
child appeared to have two natural mothers. However, the State of
California would only recognize one legal mother.' 60
The court relied upon contract principles to resolve the case. To that
end, the court analyzed the terms of the surrogacy agreement.161 The court
held that the appropriate test for determining the identity of the legal
mother of the child was the "intent" test.162 Specifically, the court stated
"she who intended to procreate the child-that is, she who intended to
bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own-is the
natural mother under California law." 63 The Calverts intended to have a
child from their genetic material. They carried out that intent by having an
embryo, created using his sperm and her egg, implanted in Anna. Anna
agreed to assist the Calverts in carrying out their intentions. The child
would not exist if the Calverts had not acted on their intentions. The court
found that Anna's intent to keep the child should not be recognized because
it conflicts with the original intentions of the parties.164 The court seems to
indicate that the existence of a traditional surrogacy arrangement would not
have changed the outcome of the case. The key factor in determining
maternity was intent and not genetics. According to some courts, intent and
genetics should take a back seat to gestation.
3. The Legal Mother Is the Woman Who Gives Birth to the Child.
A woman who gestates a child forms a special bond with that child.
That connection grows from the moment of implantation of the embryo
until the birth of the child. For forty weeks, that woman nurtures and cares
for the child.165 Some commentators have argued that this "sweat equity"
should transform the surrogate from a gestator to a cultivator.16 6 That
classification of the surrogate's role acknowledges that the surrogate
contributes something of herself to the child. Consequently, she should be
regarded as more than a womb or an incubator.'67 The surrogate role as a
e60 Id at 781. This is consistent with the state's treatment of paternity. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. I10, 118 (1989) (stating that California law does not pennit a child to have two legal fathers).
I61 Jdanr, 851 P.2d at 782.
163 Id
'65 Set Lawrence 0. Gostin, &mSrgacyfrom de Perspatme ofonomic and CiLibrm, 17 CONTEMP. HEALTH
L &POL'Y 429,435 (2001).
66S eg., Scott B. Rae, Parmtal Riift and die Defmziin ofMothahood in Surngte Modhhod, 3 S. CAL. REV. L
&WOMEN'S STUD. 219,236 (1994).
167 S Gostin, supra note 165, at 435.
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gestator should factor into the determination of maternity. That untruth is
put forth by the court in the next case.
A.H. W v. G.H.B.168
Gina, an unmarried woman, agreed to serve as a surrogate for her
sister, Andrea, and Andrea's husband, Peter. 69 Consequently, an embryo
created using Peter's sperm and Andrea's eggs was implanted into Gina's
uterus.170 Gina was not paid for her services.' 7 1 Gina became pregnant as a
result of the implantation.172 Approximately two weeks before Gina was
scheduled to give birth, Peter and Andrea petitioned the court for an order
declaring the maternity and paternity of the unborn child. 73 Specifically,
the couple asked the court to issue a prebirth order adjudicating them as the
child's legal parents and requiring that their names be listed on the child's
birth certificate.' 7 4
In support of their petition, the biological parents argued that because
Gina, the gestational surrogate, did not have a biological connection to the
child, she should not be recognized as having any parental rights with
regard to the child.175 Gina supported the couple's argument.176 Moreover,
Peter, Andrea, and Gina claimed that Gina was nothing more than an
incubator. 7 7 The court took issue with that classification of a gestational
surrogate.'78 According to the court, Gina did more than incubate the
child. To support its contention, the court described the bond between a
child and the gestational mother.'79 The court referred to Gina as a
gestational mother instead of a gestational surrogate. 80 The court felt that
title was more appropriate because of the contributions that the gestating
woman made to the child's well-being during the pregnancy.' 8'
'68 AH.W. v. G.H.B., 772 A.2d 948 (NJ. 2000); sw aboJ.F. v. D.B., 66 Pa. D & C. 4th I (C.P. Ct of Erie
County 2004).
'
69 AH. W, 772 A2d at 949.
170 fId
"3 Id at 950.
"
5 Id at 953.
176Id
'77 I
178 Id
181 I
[Vol. 49:371390
THREE LIES AAD A TRUTH
Once the court decided that the gestational mother was the child's legal
mother, the court refused to grant the prebirth order.182 After reviewing the
state statutes and case law, including the Baby M case, the court concluded
that forcing Gina to surrender her parental rights prior to the birth of the
child was contrary to New Jersey law.183 The court held that Gina could
not surrender her parental rights until seventy-two hours after she gave
birth. 84 In New Jersey, the statute required a woman to wait seventy-two
hours before consenting to the adoption of her child.'8 5 The court felt that
the same waiting period was appropriate in a case involving a gestational
surrogate because the woman would experience the same emotional and
physical changes during birth as a woman who gave birth to her biological
child.186 The court also opined that Gina had the option of changing her
mind and filing an action to retain custody of the child.187
In reaching its decision, the court emphasized that a strong connection
between the woman and the child formed during the pregnancy and at
birth. 88 That connection is not weakened by the lack of a biological link.
The mother-child relationship develops because of the dependency of the
child on the mother. The woman who supplies the eggs that result in the
creation of the embryo has a connection to the embryo but not to the
resulting child. The woman who provides the nutrients necessary for the
embryo to develop into a child is the child's natural and legal mother. That
woman is the woman who gestates the child. 89 As a consequence, gestation
is the controlling factor in adjudicating maternity.
Reproductive technology that makes surrogacy possible has resulted in
two women having the potential to receive maternal rights. 90 Thus, courts
are faced with the daunting task of adjudicating legal maternity. With little
legislative guidance, courts have embraced the lie that genetics, intent, or
gestation makes a woman a legal mother. Each of those standards is flawed.
'
82 d at 954.
183 Id
1871Id
8 e id at 953.
189 S Humitz, upra note 12, at 158.
1 Sw Hofheimer, suroa note 6, at 571.
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V. GETTING TO THE TRUTH
A. Exposing the Lies
In order to get to the truth, it is necessary to debunk the lies. The
underlying premise of the lie is that courts should determine maternity by
deciding which factors justify declaring a woman to be a legal mother.
Should motherhood be based upon blood, belief, or bonding? Is the legal
mother the woman who shared blood with the child, the woman who
believed she would be the mother, or the woman who bonded with the
child? The answer to this question is not dispositive because it is based
upon the fabrication that maternity is about the woman and not the child.
A critical evaluation of the genetics, intent, and gestation tests shows that
not one of these tests gets the courts to their end goal-selecting the best
legal mother for the child created as the result of a surrogacy agreement.
Each of the tests used by courts to determine maternity has merit.
Nonetheless, ultimate application of the tests does not consider the interests
of the child. That crucial shortcoming negates the benefits of applying the
tests. This section evaluates each test.
1. Blood Is Not Always Best
The genetics test highlights the idiom that "blood is thicker than water."
That commonly used phrase indicates that bonds are stronger between
persons who are related by blood.'9 ' Despite the widespread acceptance of
adoption, there is still a societal belief that, if possible, children should live
with their blood relatives. As a result, utilizing the genetics test is a safe
choice for a court from a public policy perspective. Furthermore, it is
logical for a court to apply the genetics test because it is consistent with prior
judicial treatment of these types of cases and lines up with the expectations
of the general public. For instance, when a man supplies the genetic
material used to create a child, he is usually given the opportunity to be
recognized as the child's legal father.192 That step is taken to protect the
man's reproductive rights. By classifying the woman who contributes the
genetic material that results in the child's conception as the legal mother,
the court is being consistent and fair.193 There is no good reason to treat
women involved in assisted reproduction arrangements different from the
191 Sx Nicole L Sauit, May MARer, Maty Fathn- The Meanig of Pwadg Armd the World, 36 SANTA
CLIARA L REv. 395, 398-99 (1996).
192Se Snyder & Bymn, lsupra note 43, at 639.
3 S& Hofheimer,supra note 6, at 601.
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men involved in similar situations. In addition, the selection of the genetics
test encourages blood relatives to stay together. The average person would
expect to rear a child who was conceived using his or her genetic material.
The court is treating the mothers of children born as the result of surrogacy
arrangements like the mothers of children conceived in other ways. For
example, in order for a child to be taken from his or her biological mother,
that woman must take affirmative steps to terminate her parental rights and
consent to an adoption.194 Women who use reproductive technology to
conceive should be given that same treatment.
Even with the advances in reproductive technology, a child cannot be
created without the use of genetic material.'95 According to John Locke,
humans have ownership of themselves and, thus, they are entitled to benefit
from the fruits of their labor.196 It follows that the person who contributes
the genetic material should be given an ownership interest in the child
conceived using that material. This is not an outrageous assertion because
courts have recognized ownership interest in sperm. In Hecht v. Superior
Court, the court held that a man had the right to leave his sperm to his
girlfriend by will. 197 A woman should have the same property interest in
her eggs.198 The Moore v. Regents of the University of California court held that a
man did not have a property interest in his cells once they were removed
from his body.199 Nonetheless, the court determined that the man had the
right to control his cells as long as they were in his body.200 Consequently,
those cells could not be removed without his informed consent. 20' Applying
this reasoning to the genetic supplier of the eggs in a surrogacy situation, a
woman has control over her eggs as long as they are inside her body. The
eggs cannot be used unless the woman gives her informed consent. In a
surrogacy situation, there should be a rebuttable presumption that the
biological mother is only consenting to the use of her eggs to conceive a
child she plans to parent. In the interest of fairness, the gestational
I IS eg., Shannon E. Phillips, nsdrg Bidding Wars in Wasigt Adophon The NMl for &atdo7 Refonn Ajr
In re Dependency of G.C.B., 70 WASH. L REv. 277, 279-80 (1995); Karen D. laverdiere, Note, Contat OVff
Fom The Skiftig ofAdophon Consrt Laws, 25 WHrnTIER L REV. 599 (2004).
195 SeeIn re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 727 (Tenn. 2005).
'- S Radhika Rao, J*opey, iay, and deHwna Boy, 80 B.U. L REv. 359,367-68 (2000) (discussing the
body as property and the influential theory ofJohn Locke on the subject).
197 Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
9 Se Erik B. Seeney, Note, Moore 10 Ymrs Later-Sfill Tygg To Fi die Gap: Creatng a Psonalo Ppeny Rzghi
in GmeticMateial 32 NEW ENG. L REV. 1131, 1170-71 (1998) (arguing for a recognition of a prperty right in
genetic material).
199 Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,493-94 (Cal. 1990).
2oo S, id
201 Id; s&e Roger F. Friedman, It's My Botp and P11 Die ifl Want To: A opey-Basal Arwnet in Suport of
AssirtaSacide, 12J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L & POL'Y 183,208 (1995).
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surrogate should have the right to rebut this presumption by introducing
evidence of a contrary intent.
The adoption of the genetics test is also consistent with prior legal
precedents. In Davis v. Davis, the court held that there is a fundamental
right to procreate and a fundamental right not to procreate. 202 This implies
that a person has the ultimate control of his or her reproductive materials.
In fact, in Davis, the court concluded that a person has a constitutional right
to control the disposition of his or her own genetic material.203 As the Belsito
court indicated, the application of the genetics test is warranted from an
evidentiary standpoint.2 04 DNA tests could be used to confirm that the
genetic mother is the biological mother of the child.205 Moreover, the
genetics test establishes a bright-line rule for determining maternity.206
Once DNA testing proves that the woman is the biological mother of the
child, it is easy to recognize her as the legal mother of the child. 207 This is
important in situations where the facility mistakenly implants a woman with
an embryo belonging to another couple.208  In essence, that woman
becomes an involuntary surrogate.209 Since she did not supply the genetic
material used to create the embryo, the woman should not have any
expectations of keeping the child. Thus, she may not be likely to file a
custody petition to keep the child. 210 The certainty that she cannot be
named the legal mother of the child may serve as a deterrent to the
2 Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 601 (Tenn. 1992); see also Christina C. Lawrence, Note, Prcreative Libery
and die mnbhy ob I dbloa LZping a Maicd and 1al Frmnawrk To Settl e Dpasition ofFrozm IRenbyos, 52 CASE
W. RES. L REV. 721, 737-38 (2002).
20 lwis, 842 S.W.2d at 602.
2o4 Sr Belsito v. Cladk, 644 N.E.2d 760, 766 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994).
20 See Christine A. Bjodcman, Note, &1ig In lbas Re Absace of Coroacud Ruiaion of Sorogate ParmTg
Agrants and Its Ffft on Paries to the Agrawwn4 21 QUINNIPIAC PROB. LJ. 141, 159 (2008) (discussing Johnson v.
Cakert and use of DNA tests as evidence in proving matemity); Amy M. Larkey, Note, Rdefnag Mothedood
Dtemnig 1eul Mtati in Gestational &moy Ammwrag ts, 51 DRAKE L REV. 605, 623 (2003) (discussingJoson
v. Cahert and use of DNA tests as evidence in pmving maternity).
206 Melanie B. Jacobs, My Tim Dad i g Biological and Social Patemiy, 38 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 809, 845
(2006).
207 Cf id (discussing use of DNA test in context of pmving paternity).
2s SeeJosh Deutsch, Note, Fmders-Kers A Bnight-lie Rule Anwring Custody to Gestational Mothers in Cases of
Fertihy Chnie Emr, 12 CARDoZoJ.L & GENDER 367, 376-77 (2005); see also L Lynn Hogue, Avoiding Parmsilessnes
by Assistal Rpuictix T-molgy (AR7) A Fnosalfor Fbfncing Cniracts and Avoidg the IbPic Pohty Dtefme in Intersate
Cases, 4 WHITTIERJ. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 269, 276-77 (2005) (discussing case involving mistaken embryo
implantation).
" See Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Suitcha at Owe Fertlity Climc Dtanig MatarlI Rights Wha a Gl is Bom from
Stlm or Mizeizrsdl Getic Matoia4 64 Mo. L REV. 517, 553-54 (1999) (discussing pmperty theory of parental
rights).
2I0 For example, Camlyn Savage voluntarily tumed over the baby to his biological parents when their
embryo was mistakenly implanted in her. Caro n Sa=ge Ohio Wan Implnztd ith Wrong Embys Gas Bit
HUFFINGTON Posr (Sept. 26, 2009), htt://www.huffingtonpostcom/2009/09/26/carlyn-savage-ohio-
womank-n_3007 10.html.
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gestational surrogate. That knowledge may help the surrogate to make a
conscious effort not to become overly attached to the fetus.
Although there are some positive aspects of the genetics test, it also
raises some key concerns. For instance, the genetics test may discourage the
use of donor eggs or traditional surrogacy arrangements. Some surrogacy
arrangements involve donated eggs.211 In that instance, neither the
contracting woman nor the gestational surrogate is the child's biological
mother. Under the reasoning of Belsito, the egg donor would be the child's
biological and legal mother. In order to relieve herself of responsibility for
the child, the egg donor would have to take legal steps to have her parental
rights terminated. Therefore, application of the genetics test may
discourage the use of egg donors. On the one hand, the contracting woman
may be afraid that the egg donor may assert her rights to the child. On the
other hand, the egg donor probably does not want to be held legally
responsible for the child. Contrary to public perception, most egg donors
are young women who are donating their eggs to receive compensation. 212
Typically, they are not interested in keeping the resulting children. 213
Legislatures in some jurisdictions have recognized that fact and have passed
statutes stating that an egg donor is never to be considered the legal mother
of the child. 214 In jurisdictions that do not have that safeguard in place, the
egg donor may end up recognized as the child's legal mother. In response
to this contention, supporters of the Belsito opinion might argue that the egg
donor can just take steps to terminate her parental rights. The contracting
couple may have to bear the cost of that legal action. As a result, adopting
the genetics test has the potential to increase the overall costs of the
reproductive process.
The genetics test ignores the fact that the oldest and most common
form of surrogacy arrangement involves the use of traditional surrogates.215
211 Se Noa Ben-Asher, The Cuig Law- On the Evsbk6on ofBaly-Makng Maets, 30 CARDOZO L REV. 1885,
1900-01 (2009).
212 See Andrews & Douglass, supra note 26, at 662-64.
2 1
3Id at 664; see Helen M. Alvare, The Case for Rpdating CoUaboratIeRepRdicwion: A Odrifm's Riets Pesptve,
40 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 1, 13-14 (2003).
2 14 Se cg., ALA. CODE § 26-17-702 (Westlaw through end of 2010 Reg. Sess.) ("A donor who donates to a
licensed physician for use by a married woman is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted
reproduction. A married couple who, under the supervision of a licensed physician, engage in assisted
reproduction through use of donated eggs, sperm, or both, will be treated at law as if they are the sole natural and
legal parents of a child conceived thereby."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-775 (West, Westlaw through the
2010 Feb. Reg. Sess.,June Spec. Sess. &July Spec. Sess.) ("An identified or anonymous donor of sperm or eggs
used in A.I.D., or any person claiming by or through such donor, shall not have any right or interest in any child
born as the result of AID.").
21- Se Ailis L Burpee, Note, Mammna Drma: A Stua4 ofHao Cada'sNamal Rdaton of Sumgay Compre to
Australia's Indpadat State Rtdaon ofSougagy, 37 GAJ. INT'L & COMP. L 305, 308 (2009); se also Suzanne F.
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This is true because the traditional surrogate is usually impregnated by
artificial insemination. Artificial insemination is affordable because it can
be done without the use of a physician or medical personnel. Gestational
surrogacy arrangements involve the use of in vitro fertilization. 216 Since in
vitro fertilization is expensive, gestational surrogacy arrangements are
costly.217 In a traditional surrogacy situation, since the surrogate supplies
the genetic material used to create the child, she would be deemed the legal
mother. This might discourage the use of traditional surrogates. The
genetics test also disregards the expectations of the parties. Application of
the genetics test reduces the surrogate to an incubator or a womb. Some
commentators have argued that this is degrading to women. 218 Treating the
surrogate as if she is nothing more than an incubator ignores the connection
the woman develops with the child during the pregnancy.219
Living with a person of the same blood may not always be the best
arrangement for the child. The news is filled with horror stories of
biological parents who have murdered or abused their children.220 Having
a blood connection to the child does not guarantee that a woman will be a
good mother. 221 Courts cannot change biological connections. When a
woman gives birth to her biological child, the maternal-child relationship is
created. Society and the law respect that relationship. Therefore, the
courts are reluctant to intervene, and only do so when the child is in
danger.222 However, courts should not assume that a blood connection is
the best way to create a maternal-child relationship. Adjudicating
maternity gives courts the opportunity to make sure that the child is not
placed in harm's way. Accepting the inveracity that because a woman
supplies the genetic material used to conceive the child she should be
adjudicated the legal mother may prevent courts from achieving that goal.
Seavello, Are Ym My Mother? A e's lkision in In Vfo Filkat.o &rgacy, 3 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 211, 212
(1992).
216 Se Usa L Behn, La* Moral & Intenational Pspfstw taon &orgate Motherhood The Call for a Umfonn
Rgulatoy Schone in the UnitAd States, 2 DEPAULJ. HEALTH CARE L 557, 558 (1999).
2Se Keith Alan Byers, Infatiity and In Vdr Fanto.-A GrowingNantr Gsonr-OrinteiRgulatii of the In
Vitro Fertita&on Indtshy, 18J. LEGALMED. 265, 285 (1997).
218 S* eg, Antoinette S. Lopez, Ificy and de Rgulation ofthe, TahnologiesA lion-MakingApproach, 22 FAM.
LQ. 173, 192 (1988).
219 See Nicole M. Healy, Beynd Sromgacy: Gestational Parenting Agermats Undr Cafoimia Law, I UCLA
WOMEN'S LJ. 89, 121 (1991); see also Anne Goodwin, Dtaninadion of Igal Parmge in Fgs Anation, Enh e
Tramplntatio ad GaiDonal SmgyArmngemnts, 26 FAM. LQ. 275, 288 (1992).
220 See Tracy L Dodds, Note, DfendingAmeica's hil&rn How de Crmot System Gets It Wrng, 29 HARv.J.L
&PUB.POL'VY 719, 719 (2006).
22 S1 eg., Suzanne D'Amico, Commnent, Inhant y Fonale Cae of Oild Abuse and Ngt A Gender-Neutral
Anaysis, 28 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 855,855-69 (2001).
m S* eg., Undsy J. Rohlf Note, The Pydolgical-Pbrmt and Ble Facto-Parmt Tbciner How Sould tie Umfom
ParmitageAct Defe 'Tarmt'?, 94 IOWA L REV. 691, 702 (2009).
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2. Believing Should Not Make It So
A surrogate agreement is a contract. Like other types of contracts it is
based upon promises between the parties. 223 The surrogate promises to
gestate and to surrender the baby to the contracting couple. In exchange,
the contracting couple promises to pay the surrogate's expenses and abide
by other terms of the agreement.224 Based upon the terms of the contract,
the contracting woman believes that she will be recognized as the mother of
the resulting child. Courts applying the intent test attempt to fulfill that
belief. The intent test is appropriate because it identifies and tries to carry
out the wishes of the parties involved in the process. Application of the
intent test is also fair to all of the contracting parties. By carrying out the
parties' intent, the court is attempting to make sure they receive the benefit
for which they bargained. Hence, the contracting couple is rewarded for
taking the steps necessary to insure the child's conception. The couple's
intent to parent the child is recognized and honored. Typically, when a
surrogate enters into an agreement, she does not intend to be recognized as
the child's legal mother. Therefore, the surrogate should not be
disappointed if she does not end up with the child. In the absence of a
mutual mistake, the parties are getting the benefit of their bargain. The
surrogate receives money to cover her expenses, and the contracting couple
receives the child they intended to parent.
The intent test is not without problems. Application of the intent test
may increase litigation because the court has to decide what the parties
intended with regard to maternity. It is always difficult for the court to
determine the subjective intent of litigants. The surrogacy contract may not
be clear on that issue. Further, the courts may not be able to decide if the
intent was informed. In order for informed intent to exist, all of the parties
must have understood the ramifications of the intent stated in the
contract. 225 The fact that the parties are in court indicates that one party
might not have fully understood the terms of the agreement. Another
problem with the intent test is that it may be difficult to apply. The
surrogacy process lasts from the implantation of the embryo until the birth
of the child. As a result, it may not be easy for the court to decide at what
223 SJerald V. Hale, Note, FRm Baby M tnjaycee B. Falke Mother and OCdidm in the Brave New WorI4 24
J. CONTEMP. L 335, 348 (1998).
224 See Stephen G. York, A Conactual Anasir ofSumgate Motherhood and a Poposed Sodion, 24 LOY. LA L
REV. 395,397--98 (1991).225 SmJay R. Combs, Comment, Stopping die Baby-Trad Afmning the Value ofHonan I1 77onigh the hnalidation
of&m,'aqy Contrats A Bapfor.v Medco, 29 N.M. L Rev. 407, 412-14 (1999).
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point in the process to evaluate the parties' intent. Prior to the child's
conception, the contracting couple probably intends to parent the child.
However, once she becomes pregnant, the surrogate may express intent to
parent the child. Thus, the court is forced to deal with evolving intents.
Each party purports an intention to procreate and raise the child. A party's
intent may change after conception, through gestation, and after birth.226 If
the jurisdiction does not recognize surrogacy contracts, it may be even more
difficult for the court to determine the true intentions of the parties with
regard to maternity.
The intent test is based upon the mendacity that the beliefs and
intentions of the parties should dictate the determination of legal maternity.
Blindly enforcing the intentions of the parties is too similar to enforcing
contracts to parent or to give up parental rights. Courts have correctly
found those types of contracts to be against public policy.227 Carrying out
the intent of the parties may not serve the best interests of the child.
Relying on the intent of the parties may be acceptable when the source of
the contract is an object. Nonetheless, when the subject of the contract is a
living, breathing child, carrying out the intent of the parties is inappropriate.
In fact, it is dangerous for the court to place undue weight on the parties'
intent without considering the best interests of the child. The child does not
have an advocate or a voice when it comes to negotiating the terms of the
contract. Hence, it is even more important that courts consider the interests
of the child when enforcing the contract. A determination of legal
maternity results in a permanent classification. Consequently, courts should
not make their decisions guided by the falsehood that their sole goal is to
give the contracting woman her anticipated outcome.
3. Bonds Are Meant To Be Broken
The bond between a mother and a child is not easily broken. That
bond starts in the womb. Throughout the three trimesters, the surrogate
nurtures and nourishes the child. 228 The bond between the woman and
child is not broken simply because she gives birth. Courts that have
adopted the gestation test for deciding legal maternity assert that the bond
between the mother and child should not be ignored. Instead of breaking
226 See Rae, wpra note 166, at 248-49.
227 S eg., T.F. v. B.L, 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1250-51 (Mass. 2004); McKee v. Flynt, 630 So. 2d 44,50 (Miss.
1993).
2 S MollyJ.W. Wilson, Fhrwmnibnmi in Frm-Mark* caimziow- Smtoy, Comnioad Adopfto and Limits m
Hw msinon Maig CaAwiy, 31 J. LEGIS. 329, 340 (2005); se also Combs, sWpra note 225, at 414-16.
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that bond, some courts use it to justify adjudicating the surrogate as the
child's legal mother. Application of the gestation test may be good for the
entire surrogacy process. The fear that the gestational surrogate may be
deemed the legal mother may cause the contracting couple to think long
and hard before selecting a surrogate. This may decrease the likelihood
that women who are not emotionally equipped to be surrogates will be
chosen to serve as surrogates. Furthermore, the gestation test indicates that
courts are sensitive to the fact that a woman who gives birth to a child
should not be treated as a stranger to the child. 229 The gestational surrogate
is the person who cultivates the embryo so that it develops into a child.
Consequently, the gestational surrogate's role is critical. The gestation test
recognizes the importance of the gestational surrogate's contribution to the
child's well-being.
One of the main problems with the gestation test is that it may permit a
woman to keep a child that was created using someone else's genetic
material. This may encourage a woman to agree to be a surrogate in order
to gain a child. In addition, the gestation test negates the importance of
genetics. It does not protect the contracting couple from a surrogate who
may have suspect motives. It may permit the surrogate to extort money and
other benefits from a desperate couple. For example, the surrogate may
threaten to seek custody of the child unless she is given additional
compensation that is not mentioned in the contract.
Another troubling aspect of the gestation test is the negative impact that
it may have on the contracting couple. Application of the test does not
weigh the costs to the contracting couple. It appears to focus solely on
protecting the interests of the surrogate. The contracting woman has a
finite number of viable eggs.230 Because of this, the gestational surrogate
should not be allowed to keep a child conceived using the infertile woman's
genetic or donated eggs. The embryo gestated by the surrogate may be the
only one the couple has left. Thus, they would be permanently deprived of
the opportunity to become biological parents.23' A test that treats the
contracting woman as an egg donor is just as demeaning as treating the
surrogate as an incubator.
22 See, eg., Leslie Bender, Ges Paroats, andAss 4Reprodctive Tawnolgie:Arts, Mi stabas, S Rar4 & Law, 12
COLUiJ. GENDER & L 1, 24 (2003).
230 Sm Kate Lyon, The Fg Carn rt, 47 ORANGE COUNTY lAw. 58, 58 (2005).
231 See Erica Howard-Potter, Bond Our amceptimr A Look at O7&m Bom rtloonous4 Through Reprodcwtm
Teknolog andNVew York Intertcy Law, 14 BUFF. WOMEN'S LJ. 23, 30-31 (2005).
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Advocates of the gestation test ignore the fact that it is based on the
untruth that, when it adjudicates maternity, the court should primarily be
concerned with protecting the bond between the gestating woman and the
child. Separating the child from his or her biological mother may be
detrimental to the child. Typically, children have a desire to know the
persons who contributed the genetic materials that resulted in their
conception. For example, historically, adopted children have often
attempted to locate their biological parents.232 Similarly, children created as
the result of artificial insemination have taken steps to learn the identity of
the sperm donors who helped to conceive them.233 The contributions of the
gestational surrogate are important, but they should not be elevated above
the needs of the child.
B. Setting Forth the Truth
Legal maternity should be adjudicated in a manner that promotes the best interests of the
child.
Children do not get to choose their biological mothers. They do not get
a voice in the process. However, children are the most affected by
maternity determinations. 234 When a child is conceived naturally, there is
nothing courts can do to assure that the child gets the best mother possible.
Courts do not get involved in the process unless the woman does something
to endanger the child.235 Even a woman with a history of child abuse gets
the right to parent her child without judicial interference unless evidence
exists indicating she is currently abusing or neglecting the child.236 Courts
have the opportunity to select mothers for children created as the result of
surrogacy arrangements. To protect the welfare of the children, courts
should make the most of that opportunity. The truth is that maternity
should be determined by focusing on the best interests of the child.
The determination of the legal mother impacts the child. Therefore, it
is impossible to make that decision without considering the best interests of
232 S eg., Naomi Calm &Jana Singer, Adopon, IM4, and Vie Gatsadim The Caefor OpWg osd Reords,
2 U.PA.J. CoNST. L 150,175 (1999).
3 Sa; eg., Anne R. Schiff Fn frratnteations and Bindity Biol: Sing AID in &e Lao, 44 DuKE LJ. 524,
564-66 (1994) (arguing in favor of allowing children bom of artificial insemination to learn identity of spenn
donors).
23 Cf Hurwitz, supra note 12, at 129-33.
2 See Lakey, aupra note 205, at 626-27.
23 SA; eg., Diane I. Bonina & Ruth A. Baha-Jachna, The Trianent of Oddem as O)attd in Recm Adopion
Daiions, 26 HuM, RTS. 2, 3 (1999); James G. Dwyer, The Oi fotration Iretmsc Stater' Cntraud COnsgnai of
Nvborn Babies to t Fharets, 93 MINN. L REv. 407,408 (2008).
400 [Vol. 49:371
THREE LIESANDA TRUTH
the child.237 Since surrogacy agreements are not regulated or heavily
scrutinized in most jurisdictions, it is probably even more important to have
a neutral third party, like a court, looking out for the best interests of the
child. 238 In custody and visitation hearings, courts have the discretion to
appoint a guardian ad litem or other advocate to protect the interests of the
child.239 That practice is not followed in disputes involving the surrogate
and the contracting woman. Thus, the court needs to take extra care to
make sure that the child's welfare is protected. The best interests of the
child should be the determining factor in most custody cases involving the
welfare of children.240 A review of the treatment of children born as the
result of sexual intercourse will illustrate why the best interests of the child
standard is the correct one to use to adjudicate maternity.
1. Sexual Intercourse
a. The Evolution
Historically, when making custody determinations, courts were mainly
concerned with protecting a man's right to control his lawful children.
Thus, in England, custody decisions were made based upon a paternal
preference. 241 The father was entitled to custody of his child regardless of
the circumstances. A man was awarded custody of the child even if he
literally snatched the baby away from its mother's breast. 242 The paternal
preference was based upon the belief that the woman and the child were the
man's property.243  The only way the woman could overcome the
preference was to prove that the man was a danger to the child.244
Initially, American courts adopted this paternal preference and
concluded that a man's right to the custody of his children was superior to
any other interests. 245  Even though the courts limited the paternal
237 Cf Hurwitz,.spra note 12, at 129.
238 S Glenda Labadie-Jackson, The Repalucky Rze of Latiosr and Canmmial &vgacy Conbrae, 14 TEX.
HISP.J.L & POLY 49, 56-58 (2008).
23 S* &g., Rebecca Hinton, Comment, Gbng Oid& a Riht To & Hemk &gustd Rfonns To Ptwide
Louiina Oi& a Vacem i MYOld ta Diputer, 65 L. L REV. 1539,1544-46 (2005).
240 S Angela R. Russo, Connent, Guts i Odd Custafr Actims and d&e QAesti ofDischmgabiit, 2004 U.
CI. LEGAL F. 593,614-16 (2004).
241 S eg., R v. De Manneville, (1804) 102 Eng. Rep. 1054 (KB.).
242 S* eg., id
243 Se Phyllis T. Bookspan, Fun a Tder rs Ampr ian to a Ihimmy Pss IRestnpon. Has Anylang Radlyt
Oumga. . .Stouldl, 8 BYUJ. PUB. L 75, 78-79 (1993).
2"S eg., Arlene B. Huber, Odikm at Risk in te blP s of Cild Custdy &dte Adoxawging Their Nls for
Nurtoe, 32 U. LUISVILIEJ. FAM. L 33,37-39 (1993).
245 S eg., Ullman v. Ullman, 135 N.Y.S. 1080, 1081 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912).
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preference somewhat by considering the best interests of the child, the
man's right to retain custody of his children was the prevailing factor in
custody disputes.246 One could argue that the paternal preference served
the best interests of the child because the father usually was the one with the
economic resources to provide the best life for the child. The paternal
preference in custody cases was slowly replaced by maternal preference in
the form of the "tender years" doctrine. 247
According to the tender-years doctrine, young children should be
placed with their mothers because mothers are better equipped to provide
them with the nurturing that they need.248 Courts applying the tender-years
doctrine combined the maternal preference and the best interests of the
child standard. In making custody determinations, the courts considered
the age of the child to be the primary factor in deciding which placement
would promote the child's best interest. 249 Thus, regardless of the mother's
fitness, courts presumed that a young child was best served by remaining in
the custody of his or her mother.250 The court made decisions about the
child's well-being based upon assumptions about the mother-child
relationship and not based upon the needs of the specific child before the
court.251 The presumption could be overcome by a showing that the
mother was indeed unfit. 252
The presumption favoring mothers gave way to the best interests of the
child standard. Courts started awarding custody based upon which parent
was in the best position to promote the child's interests.253 Courts are
afforded broad discretion with regard to custody determinations. 254 The
primary goal of the court is to promote the best interests of the child.255 In
all American jurisdictions, the best interests of the child standard has been
246 S4 eg., id at 1081-83.
217 S Jennifer M. Waterworth, Case Comment, Pmaen and -wulofor Aukrd of Custm: The Nrth
Dakta &prone Cot Recograes that "StayAt-Hmne-11d" War Not Discirnnated Against Due to Iu Non-Traditional Role,
75 N.D. L REv. 391, 395-97 (1999).
248 Cf Stephanie N. Barnes, Comment, Srngthong the Faher-Oild Renlionrk 77omugh a Joint Cutody
Jeaosnon, 35 W.IAMETTE L REv. 601, 605-06 (1999).
24 See Waterworth, .upra note 247, at 396.
25o Se Brian J. Melton, Note, Solomon's Wisdon or Solomon's Wisdan Last- Oild Cutody in North Dakota--A
eswnpton that joiw Cato Is m te Best Interests ofthe Cild m Cistody Dispute, 73 N.D. L REV. 263, 268 (1997).
21 See Marcia O'Kelly, Blessing the Tie that Bind Inefeace for the Pimmy Caretaker as Qsdvi, 63 N.D. L REV.
481,487-88 (1987).
252 Raymon Zapata, Comment, Oild Csmto# in Teo and the Best Inest S zdand- In the et Interest of Whm?, 6
SCHOIAR 197, 200 (2003).
253 Se Mary K Kearney, The Nw Paradgm in Custa Law Loking at Parents with a ImMg Ee, 28 ARIZ. ST.
LJ. 543,549 (1996).
254 S* eg., Foidv. Ford, 789 A.2d 1104,1113 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
255 Se Miller v. A. Dep't of Human Servs., 167 S.W.3d 153, 156 (Ark. CL App. 2004).
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adopted.256 A majority of states have statutes requiring courts to apply the
standard whenever it makes custody decisions impacting a child.257 Other
states do not have statutes mandating use of the standard. Nonetheless, in
those jurisdictions courts have developed a best-interests standard by case
law.258 Courts make numerous decisions that impact children, including
placement and custody determinations, safety and permanency planning,
and proceedings for termination of parental rights. When it makes these
types of decisions, the court must consider whether its decision will be in the
best interests of the child.259
b. The Explanation
There is no uniform definition of the best interests of the child
standard. 260 Thus, it is difficult to explain what courts mean when they
refer to the standard. Generally, courts rely on several different factors to
determine the best outcome for the child.261 The factors focus upon the
needs of the child and the capacity to satisfy those needs by the potential
caregivers. 262 The court's paramount concern is the safety and well-being of
the child. 263 Instead of mandating that courts apply certain factors, state
statutes typically enumerate guiding principles for courts to consider in
making best-interests determinations. 264 This method gives courts the
flexibility to make custody determinations on a case-by-case basis. It also
acknowledges that children have unique circumstances and needs. Hence,
a bright-line rule that results in a one-size-fits-all approach may not serve
the best interests of the child.
Courts have discretion to decide what is in the child's best interests, but
that discretion is not absolute. In their statutes, some states and the District
of Columbia list specific factors for courts to consider when making
256 Carr, spra note 11, at 125; Lauren D. Freeman, The Ol's Best Interests as die Paret's Free Eerise of
Relgion, 32 Colum.J.L & Soc. Probs. 73, 76 (1998).
25 S, eg, DEL CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722(a) (Westlaw through 77 Laws 2010, chs. 1-475); Cookson v.
Cookson, 514 A2d 323, 328-29 (Conn. 1986); Rachel Sinness, Note, TheBestInterests ofde OddandtheRghtr ofthe
Parent Damon vs. Damwn and the FuoRh of Parmting ad OWd Custey in NorDt Tbkta, 84 N.D. L REV. 999,1014
(2008).
25 Se ag., In re Custody of Kali, 792 N.E.2d 635, 639-40 (Mass. 2003).
2" See Carr, .upra note 11, at 125-27.260 Se Freeman, supra note 256, at 76.261 Se ShannonJ. Kennedy-Sjodin, Note, Keegan v. Gudahl- The Gald's Sumane as aNea Baganing Cho in
he Gane ofDorce, 41 S.D. L REV. 166,186-87 (1995).
262 Se id; see, g., Davidson v. Davidson, 576 N.W.2d 779, 785 (Neb. 1988).
263 Seg, Shiver v. Shiver, 576 So. 2d 671, 671 (Ala Civ. App. 1991).
264 S* ag, FtA STAT. ANN. § 39.810 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 274 (End) of 2010 2d Reg. Sess. of the
21st Leg.).
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decisions with regard to the best interests of the child. 265 The factors that
must be evaluated differ from state to state. No one factor is dispositive or is
entitled to be given greater weight than any of the others.266 Although the
language of the statutes varies, legislatures appear to be mainly concerned
with those factors that are relevant to the parents' fitness and the child's
needs. A survey of court cases indicates that most courts make their
decisions by relying on factors that deal with those two concerns. The Price
v. Price case is a good illustration of the analysis a court undertakes when
determining what action is necessary to promote the best interests of the
child. 267
The Prie court had to decide which custodial arrangement was best for
the child. In its analysis, the court considered the following seven factors:
"(1) parental fitness; (2) stability; (3) primary caretaker; (4) child's preference;
(5) harmful parental conduct; (6) separation of siblings; and (7) substantial
change in circumstances." 268 Only the first six factors are relevant to an
initial custody determination. 269 With regard to parental fitness, the court
attempted to ascertain which parent could provide the child with the best
care.270 In making that determination, the court evaluated the physical and
mental health of each parent.27' The court also evaluated their approach to
parenting.272 In order to evaluate the stability of each parental home, the
court examined the nature of the parental and nonparental relationships the
child had established. 273 Further, the court looked at the level of contact the
child had with the external communities where his parents resided.274
265 S eg., 705 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1-3(4.05) (West, Westlaw through PA 96-1402 of the 2010
Reg. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 620.023 (West, Westlaw through end of 2010 legis.); MD. CODEANN., FANL
IAW § 5-525(f)(1) (West, Westlaw through all chs. of the 2010 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assem., effective through
Oct. 1, 2010).
2 66 S; eg., In re Pleuffer, 837 A2d 311, 314 (N.H. 2003).
267 Pice v. Price, 611 N.W.2d 425, 430-36 (S.D. 2000).
268 Id at 430.
269 S eg., id at 436 (applying "substantial change of circumstances" in context of changing custody).
270 SM id at 430.
2" So id at 430-32.
272 S id In particular, the court analyzed the following fictors relating to parental fitness:
(1) mental and physical health; (2) capacity and disposition to provide the child with protection, food,
clothing, medical care, and other basic needs; (3) ability to give the child love, affection, guidance,
education and to impart the family's religion or creed, (4) willingness to maturely encourage and
provide frequent and meaningful contact between the child and the other parent; (5) commitment to
prepare the child for responsible adulthood, as well as to insure that the child experiences a fulfilling
childhood; and (6) exemplary modeling so that the child witnesses firsthand what it means to be a
good parent, a loving spouse, and a responsible citizen.
Id at 430 (quoting Fuerstenberg v. Fuerstenberg, 591 N.W.2d 798,807 (N.D. 1999)).
27 Id at 432.
274 S id The court evaluated stability by emphasizing the following factoes
(1) the relationship and interaction of the child with the parents, stepp nts, siblings and extended
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The court concluded that the primary caretaker was the person who
had spent the most time parenting the child prior to the hearing.275 The
primary caretaker could also be the person who would be able to spend the
most time with the child after the custody determination. 276 The court gave
this person a slight advantage. The child's age and maturity was also a
factor. 277 If the court determined that the child was sufficiently old and
mature enough, the court would give weight to the child's preference.278
The harmful-parental-conduct factor only comes into play when the parent
acts in a way that negatively impacts the child's physical and/or emotional
well-being.279 The court's decision was also influenced by a desire to keep
siblings together. 280 After considering all of these factors, the court held that
a change in custody was not in the child's best interests.281 Courts use
different factors to determine the appropriate custodial arrangement for the
child. Nonetheless, they all focus upon evaluating the fitness of the parents
and the needs of the child involved in the case.
2. Surrogacy
As it currently exists, the best interests of the child standard is applied
predominately to preexisting parental arrangements. It is not used to make
initial parentage determinations. In situations involving children conceived
by sexual intercourse, it is understandable that courts should not become
involved in adjudicating the parentage of every child born in the country.
That would be judicially infeasible and probably unconstitutional. Giving
courts the discretion to apply the best interests of the child standard to initial
parentage decisions would unduly interfere with the right to privacy and the
parental right to the care, custody, and control of their children.282
However, surrogacy situations are different. In cases involving children
families; (2) the child's adjustment to home, school and community, (3) the parent with whom the
child has formed a closer attachment, as attachment between parent and child is an important
developmental phenomena and breaking a healthy attachment can cause detriment; and (4)
continuity, because when a child has been in one custodial setting for a long time pursuant to court
order or by agreement, a court ought to be reluctant to make a change if only a theoretical or slight
advantage for the child might be gained.
Id (quoting Fuelstaberg, 591 N.W.2d at 808).
275 Id at 433-34.
276 Id at 433 ("The primary caretaker can be identified by determining 'which parent invested
predominant time, care and consistency in raising the child."' (quoting Fumtaberg, 591 N.W.2d at 808)).
277 Id at 434.
278 S, id
279 S& id at 435.
280 Sw id at 435-36.
281 Id at 436.
282 Cf Solangel Maldonado, Whm FathB (or Mother) Assn't Knw Bett Quzsi-Par miad Parmtal mezjhr
Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L REV. 865, 895 (2003).
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conceived as a result of surrogacy agreements, the dispute is usually not
about custody; it's about parentage. We live in a society of laws; therefore,
people should be discouraged from settling their own disputes. By the time
the case comes to court, the relationship between the surrogate and the
contracting persons has usually deteriorated. Thus, the odds of a peaceful
resolution of the matter are slim. Hence, the court must intervene to keep
the peace and to protect the child. Thus, using the best interests of the child
standard to make initial parentage decisions in surrogacy situations may be
acceptable.
a. Arguing for the "Best Interests of the Child" Test
Johnson v. Calvert (Dissenting Opinion)283
The dissent in the Johnson case correctly concluded that the appropriate
test for determining the legal mother of the child is the best interests of the
child standard.284 According to the dissent, the gestational mother and the
genetic mother were both the child's natural mothers, so both had an equal
claim to the child.285 Nonetheless, since the state only permitted one
woman to be classified as the child's legal mother, the court had to decide
which woman was entitled to wear that label. 286 After reviewing the facts
and applicable law, the dissent opined that the legal issue was which factor
should be the tie-breaker when determining whether to designate the
surrogate or the contracting woman as the child's legal mother.287 The
dissent maintained that the standard should be the "best interests of the
child" because that standard would enable the court to reach the decision
that was most protective of the child's welfare. 288 In addition, the dissent
contended that the intent test was too inflexible to serve the child's best
interests. 289 The dissent concluded that the court should evaluate the
households and lifestyles of both mothers to determine which placement
would be in the child's best interests. 290 The dissent ultimately proposed
283Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 788 (Cal. 1993) (KennardJ., dissenting).
84 Id at 789.
28 Id
286 SM id
287 See id at 799.
M Sm id at 795-99.
2% See i at 799-8W.
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that courts determine maternity on a case-by-case basis relying on the best
interests of the child standard.29'
Applying the best interests of the child standard to determine maternity
is a good idea because it is consistent with the standard the court uses to
determine custody, visitations, and other issues with regard to children.292
Also, the best interests of the child standard gives the courts flexibility. That
flexibility is important because different factual situations may lead to
different outcomes. 293  The child is the one person involved in the
transaction that does not have a voice, so the court's primary concern
should be ensuring that the child's interests are protected.
As currently applied, the best interests of the child test has its
weaknesses because it focuses too much on the fitness of the women. The
application of the best interests of the child standard may encourage
litigation. If the surrogate changes her mind and decides that she wants to
keep the child, she knows that, if she can prove that she is in the best
position to care for the child, she has a chance of winning custody of the
child. Another concern is that the traditional best interests of the child
standard is too subjective.294 Judges may be influenced by their own culture
and beliefs when deciding which woman would make the better mother.295
As a result, judicial biases may disadvantage one woman. For instance,
courts may favor the contracting couple over the single surrogate. Further,
traditional couples may be favored over nontraditional couples. 296 Most
surrogates are women with modest means.297  Thus, they may be
disadvantaged if the courts focus on which woman can provide the child
with the most financial resources.
A further weakness of the best interests of the child standard presently
being applied is that it may result in an outcome that is contrary to the
parties' intentions. Courts will be forced to decide how to break the tie
when both women are fit to care for the child. The best interests of the
child test ignores the expectations of the parties. In some instances, the best
'
9 1 Se id at 800.
292 SA eg., sources cited supra note 257.
291 See Rachel M. Colancecco, Note, A Rcsible Solution to a Knotty Poblen* The Best I s ofthe GOid &dard in
Reocaim Disputes, I DREXEL L REV. 573,607 (2009); sw also T.B. v. LR.M., 753 A.2d 873, 888 (Pa. Super. Ct
2000) ("The 'best interest of the child' standard considers all factors that legitimately have an influence upon the
child's physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual well being on a case-by-case basis.").
29 4 S Gilliam, supra note 12, at 530.
295 Se id
2* SW id
2' Sw Andrews & Douglass, supra note 26, at 673-74 (pmviding demographics of surogates); Barbara L
Atwell, &orogay andAdoption A Ge ofIncanpatibiti, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L REv. 1, 43 (1988).
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interests of the child test may result in the surrogate being unjustly enriched
if she is adjudicated as the best person to parent the child.298
The best interests of the child standard is not used to adjudicate
maternity in cases involving children conceived by sexual intercourse. In
those instances, the test typically comes into play when the court has to
decide whether to terminate the woman's maternal rights. It is as if the law
gives a woman who conceives naturally the benefit of the doubt and
presumes that she retains her maternal rights until something occurs to
rebut the presumption that she is a good mother. The application of the
best interests of the child test to determine maternity in a surrogacy
situation results in both women having to prove that they are fit to parent
the child before anything happens to put that fact in dispute. The
shortcomings of the best interests of the child standard are outweighed by
the usefulness of the standard. If it is adapted to meet the unique needs of a
child conceived as the result of surrogacy agreements, the best interests of
the child standard is the one courts should use to adjudicate maternity.
b. Applying the "Best Interests of the Child" Test
The best interests of the child standard encompasses two main
components: protection of the physical and psychological well-being of the
child and fairness to the women involved in the process. When adjudicating
maternity, courts should strive to place the child in a home where his or her
needs will be met. Courts should also seek to insure that the outcome is fair
to the women involved in the process. Nevertheless, the primary goal of the
courts should be to promote the best interests of the child. The best
interests of the child standard should be adapted to apply to surrogacy
situations that require an adjudication of maternity. Generally, courts apply
the standard in cases involving issues of custody, visitation, and termination
of parental rights. In surrogacy cases, the women are asking to be
adjudicated the legal mother of the child. This is similar to a request for
custody.
As indicated earlier, a key consideration in custody cases is parental
fitness.299 All things being equal, the parent that is most fit is usually
awarded custody. In a custody case, an evaluation of parental fitness
indicates that the person has a track record that the court can review.
m SieJohn M. Suender, Comment, Storogate Moderhood Agrawnats ad tie Law in Ponya 91 DICK. L
REV. 1085,1107 (1987).
9 Se supra text accompanying notes 270-72; sw also Riichan F. Stonow, The Bietiie oflhspeive Pamdrthod-
In Iosit of thelIoper &mtddfor Gatakping in Ifp Cinics, 28 CARDOZO L REV. 2283, 2304 (2007).
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When a court has to make an initial parentage determination, it is often
difficult to evaluate parental fitness. Custody determinations are usually
made after the child has been living with one or both of the parties for a
period of time. In addition, custody disputes usually involve a man and a
woman battling for physical custody of the child.300 In those types of cases,
it makes sense for the courts to consider factors like parenting skills and the
emotional ties between the parent and the child. When adjudicating
maternity, courts are typically unable to obtain evidence relevant to those
factors. The contracting couple is often childless, so it is difficult to
determine whether or not they will be good parents. The surrogate may or
may not already have children that she conceived through sexual
intercourse. At the time most maternity actions are brought before the
court, the child usually is not emotionally attached to either woman.
The surrogacy situation is different enough from the custody dispute to
justify modifying the best interests of the child standard. Courts should take
a needs-based approach as opposed to a parental-rights approach. A needs-
based approach emphasizes the needs of the child. To the contrary, a
parental-rights approach focuses upon the rights of the parents. Parents
have the right to custody of their children unless they are shown to be
unfit.30' The correct test to adjudicate legal maternity is a best interests of
the child test that evaluates parental potential, environmental stability, and
primary-caretaker status.
i. Parental Potential
In custody cases, courts evaluate the fitness of the persons seeking
custody. This is not the appropriate approach for maternity adjudication
cases. The focus should be on the needs of the child. The woman who has
the best potential to provide for the child's needs should be adjudicated the
legal mother. In order to assess parental potential, courts should consider
the following factors for each woman: (1) the emotional and physical health;
(2) the financial resources available; and (3) the support system in place.
The emotional health of the woman is important because the mother's
mental condition will impact the child's emotional development. Moreover,
a woman who is emotionally unstable may physically harm or fail to protect
I S eg., Jerry A. Behnke, Note, Paunt or PeapI A I%&tg die Best Intrasts of qOildm i Interstate Curtod
Dispute, 28 LOY. LA. L REV. 699, 702 (1995) (discussing history of custody disputes between natural parents and
best-interests test).
301 S Stormow, .wpra note 299, at 2303.
2011] 409
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LAW REVIEW
the child from harm.30 2 The woman's physical health is relevant because an
unhealthy woman will have a difficult time caring for the child. This is
especially critical if the woman will be the child's only parent. It is crucial
that the woman has enough financial resources to provide the child with
adequate food, clothing, and shelter. Due to the circumstances of his or her
birth, the child born as a result of a surrogacy arrangement may need more
family support than a child born by other means. This family support can
come in the form of extended family or friends.
ii. Stability
Courts should also evaluate the women's ability to provide a stable
environment for the child.303 To make that determination, courts should
take into account the employment history of the women, the length of time
the women have been in their homes, and the relationship between the
women and their husbands or significant others. A woman's work history is
relevant to determining whether or not she is economically stable.
Economic stability is essential because children born into poverty face
numerous challenges.304 The length of time a woman has been in her home
impacts the child's ability to receive a good education and to form a social
network. Both of those things are necessary for a child to have a successful
life. Children are profoundly affected by the interactions between the adults
in their lives, especially their parents. Children with two adult caretakers
tend to have better outcomes than those raised in single-parent homes.305
iii. Primary Caretaker
Finally, courts should designate one of the women as the primary
caretaker of the child. The primary caretaker should be given preference
with regard to custody.306 The woman who has invested the most time in
caring for the child should be named the primary caretaker. When
302 S eg., In re R.B., I, 674 N.W.2d 685,685 (Iowa CL App. 2003).
3' See Claudio DeBellis & Marta B. Soja, Note, Gregory K._ Chd Standing in Parmtal Temnination Iscealings
and the Inplicaiou of the Fstr P lmt-Faser Cild Relatims/ on the Best Inters Stadmrd, 8 ST. JOHN'SJ. LEGAL
COMMENT. 501, 519 (1993).
304 S eg., Virginia S. Radding, Intetion v. Irplnnmtatron. Are May Cildrm, Ronovelfro m 7heir Biological
Fmnili, Beig NIoat tor DpnmtP, 6 U.C. DAVISJ.JUV. L & POLY 29,41-42 (2001).
35 S* eg., W. Bradford Wilcox & Robin F. Wilson, Bringnog Up Baby. Adoption Mmige, and the But Interats of
the OWild, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.J. 883,891-94 (2006).
6 S- eg., Gary Crippen, Stronb&ng Bymd Best Intrests ofthe Gild R.aming Oild Custady SnmdardSeting in
the Wok of umenta's Four Yar Ernerimt uith die linuuy Gtr lftirnce, 75 MINN. L REV. 427, 434-37 (1990);
Pamela Lauler-Ukeles, Sdlatim Rawgnieion ofGade Damce in de Law. Reahng the Caretahr Role, 31 HARV.J.L &
GENDER 1, 47 (2008).
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determining the amount of time that the women have invested in the child,
courts should look at all of the circumstances surrounding the child's
conception and birth. Courts should contemplate the amount of effort the
women exerted to ensure the child's conception and birth. The contracting
woman's efforts to have the child conceived should be acknowledged. If the
case involves a traditional surrogate, the contracting woman should be
credited for arranging for the surrogate's eggs to be fertilized with the sperm
obtained by the contracting woman. In a gestational surrogacy situation,
the contracting woman's contribution of genetic material to make the
child's conception possible should weigh in favor of finding her to be the
primary caretaker.
Courts should also examine the surrogate's pre-conception role. A
traditional surrogate supplies genetic material and her womb to enable the
child to be conceived.307 The gestational surrogate also plays an important
part in the child's conception. In addition to providing the womb, the
gestational surrogate takes certain medicines to prepare her body for the
surrogacy.308
After the child is conceived, the surrogate is responsible for protecting
the fetus, so that the child can be born healthy. The contracting woman's
role is limited post-conception. Nonetheless, she does make some
contributions such as attending the prenatal appointments and paying for
the medical expenses. By going through labor, the surrogate takes the steps
that are necessary to ensure that the child is born. Although she does not
make a physical contribution during that stage of the process, the
contracting woman makes an emotional investment in the child's well-
being. Prior to assigning the role of primary caretaker, courts should take
into account the part that the surrogate and the contracting woman played
in the conception and birth of the child.
iv. Fairness
A valid criticism of the best interests of the child standard is that it is too
subjective. That subjectivity permits judges to make custody decisions
based on their own biases. In order to be fair to all of the parties, the
legislatures should authorize the creation of surrogacy review boards.
Currently, several jurisdictions have statutes setting forth the requirements
30 S Watson, .pra note 29, at 529.
3 Se Flavia Berys, Iknreig a Rit-A-Warnb Ombct Hav Grkfmrna Cxott Mould Peed What Gatalional
SuVAge nots Go Sour, 42 CAL W. L REV. 321, 330 (2006) (discussing necessity for gestational surrogate to
go thmugh hormonal stimulation for egg retreval).
2011] 411
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LA WREVIEW
that gestational surrogacy agreements must meet to be valid.309 Moreover,
in some states, surrogacy agreements must be court approved in order to be
enforceable.s1o Consequently, permitting surrogacy review boards to make
recommendations with regard to maternity would not be overly intrusive.
The boards would be made up of independent experts. Currently, courts
are forced to listen to competing experts hired by the parties.31" These
experts are being paid to advocate for the positions of the persons who hire
them. Hence, they may not be concerned with promoting the best interests
of the child. Even a court-appointed guardian ad litem may not be
completely impartial. The surrogacy review boards would consider all of
the relevant facts of a case through a best interests of the child lens and
make recommendations to the court. The recommendations would not be
binding, but they would give guidance to the courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
The advances in reproductive technology have given women more
reproductive choices. Women are able to rewind their biological clocks and
become mothers later in life. If a woman is unable to carry a child, she may
be able to utilize the services of a surrogate to become a mother. The
amount of assistance the woman receives from the surrogate depends upon
the state of her reproductive health. A woman who is no longer capable of
producing eggs can arrange for a traditional surrogate to supply the eggs
and to carry the child to term. Gestational surrogacy is an option for the
woman who cannot carry the embryo made from her genetic material.
Surrogacy is a great way to create a family.
If medicine is the hare, the law is the tortoise. As long as the surrogate
honors the contract and surrenders custody of the child to the contracting
woman, everything goes smoothly. However, when faced with custody
disputes involving surrogates and contracting women, courts are not sure
how to react. For courts, the resolution of traditional custody disputes is
easy because the law is well-settled. In surrogacy dispute cases, since two
women are seeking to be declared the legal mother of the child, instead of
deciding custody, courts have to adjudicate maternity. As a consequence of
the lack of clear legislative guidance and bright-line rules, courts have relied
M S eg., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 47/25 (West, Wcsdaw tuough PA 96-1402 of the 2010 Reg.
Sess.).
slo S g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (West, Wesdaw thiough end of2010 Reg. Sess.).
3S1* eg., laura Sack, Wmn and O Ida Femt A Fwdid Anauis ofthe 1)inay Crtafr Stdard in OdWd
stody Case, 4 YALEJ.L & FEMINISM 291, 297 (1992).
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upon several different theories to decide whether the surrogate or the
contracting woman should be declared the legal mother of the child. The
underlying premise of three of those theories is the lie that the standard for
determining maternity should be the actions of the women. The final
theory is based upon the truth that the test for adjudicating maternity
should focus on the needs of the child.
In situations involving children born as the result of sexual intercourse,
the common law rule is that the woman who gives birth to the child is the
child's legal mother. Since the woman who gives birth is also the woman
who supplies the genetic material to conceive the child, the rule is relatively
easy to implement. Things become more complicated when one woman
gives birth to a child conceived using the genetic material of another
woman. In those cases, some states follow the common law fallacy and
conclude that, since she gives birth to the child, the surrogate should be
recognized as the child's legal mother. This approach is referred to as the
gestational theory of maternity. Other courts believe the lie that the sole
indicator of maternity should be genetics. Thus, the woman who supplied
the genetic material used to create the child should be designated as the
child's legal mother. California and other jurisdictions have embraced the
untruth that maternity should be determined by relying on the intent of the
parties. Therefore, the woman who signed the contract intending to parent
the child should be deemed to be the child's legal mother.
The court that decided the Baby M case used the best interests of the
child standard to award custody of the child. At least one judge has realized
the truth. He argued that this same standard should be used to determine
whether the surrogate or the contracting woman should be recognized as
the child's legal mother. For decades, courts have relied upon the best
interests of the child standard to make decisions that impact children.
Nonetheless, the standard has not been used to make initial parentage
determinations. Although the standard has been around for a long time, it
is still not well-developed. Neither the legislatures nor the courts have put
forth a clear definition of what the "best interests of the child" means.
Courts evaluate various factors to decide which outcome will promote the
child's best interests.
The correct standard for adjudicating maternity is a modified version of
the best interests of the child standard. Courts should not apply the
standard to maternity adjudication cases in the same manner that they
apply them in custody cases. In order to choose the maternal arrangement
that will promote the child's best interests, courts should consider the
parental potential of each woman, the stability of each woman, and the
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investment that each woman made to ensure the child's conception and
birth. In the interest of fairness, courts should seek guidance from an
independent board of experts.
